.::Defining Abnormality Essay::.

Critically discuss definitions of abnormality

In studying the field of abnormal psychology it is inherently necessary to look at what abnormality actually is. Unfortunately, there are several ideas for its definition, none of which are wholly suitable. Most successful may be some form of combination of all the suggestions which are discussed below.

Perhaps the most obvious definition of abnormality is that it is statistically infrequent behaviour. This appeals to common sense as it is the general definition of ‘abnormal’ ( : not complying with social norms) but is it appropriate when considering psychopathology?

One immediate problem with this definition of abnormality concerns its nature as a continuum- a normal distribution curve. At which point should a line be drawn over which one ‘becomes’ abnormal? Additionally, there are many behaviours or characteristics which are statistically infrequent but which would not be considered to be pathological. Examples of this would include people with exceptionally high intelligence quotients or with gifts in athletics. These characteristics would be seen as beneficial and so not indicative of psychological disorder (the possible benefits of some diagnosable psychological disorders will be discussed later).

Clearly then, some arbitrary statistically infrequent behaviour (such as experiencing hallucinations) may be shown to be abnormal using this concept of abnormality, but giving a generally applicable definition is more complex.

Another idea would be to look at whether the specific behaviour in question violates social norms or if it would disturb or threaten those around the person. An example of times where this definition is successful is ‘psychotic’ behaviour. However, examples can also be found where this definition does not suffice. One such example would be the case of a highly anxious person where no onlookers are likely to be affected but which is considered (and, in my opinion, rightfully so) as a psychological disorder.

Looking from the opposite angle, a criminal may not be treated by the psychiatric system and yet criminals are guilty of defying social norms. However, many (perhaps even all?) criminals may be psychopaths or may be suffering from antisocial personality disorders, both of which are considered in the psychiatric system. Others would say that all criminals have some form of psychiatric disorder, that criminal behaviour is a disorder in itself.

For the question of social norms, these are difficult to define themselves because of cultural variation. If social norms vary between cultures then, theoretically, one could be considered psychologically disturbed in one culture and yet not in another. However, this may not be a major criticism of the violation of social norms theory of abnormality because it brings up the question of context. It is true that someone in one culture may be reacting abnormally for their culture and upbringing, and could reasonably be considered to have a psychiatric disorder while someone where this reaction is normal, or learnt, may not have a disorder. This follows on from the idea that society shapes the course and even the type of disorder resulting from underlying psychological distress.

The third definition of abnormality claims that it is involved with personal distress. As with previous ideas, there are examples both in support (e.g.: depression and anxiety disorders) and in opposition (e.g.: psychosis) of this theory. However, perhaps underneath a psychosis the person may be in some sort of psychological distress, or may feel fear at their ‘condition’.

Again, looking from the other direction can also go against this theory. Some personal distress is not indicative of a psychological disorder. Examples include pain felt during childbirth or grief at the loss of a close friend or relative. Diagnostic manuals have taken bereavement into account by only allowing it to become a disorder when grief is prolonged.

Additionally, the degree of distress one reports is entirely subjective and it is hard to compare degrees of distress. The only way to do this is to look at severity of symptoms, at which point this becomes a circular argument. Another idea of abnormality looks at disability and dysfunction. This attempts to see if there is some impairment in work or personal relationships (or if there would be potential for this to occur as a result of the proposed disorder). For example. substance abuse disorders will affect the person economically socially and may affect their occupation. Similarly, a phobia may make someone housebound.

However, not all diagnosable disorders cause some form of disability (such as transvestism; only a psychological disorder if the person experiences some distress). Other more readily diagnosed disorders are not always seen to be disabilities for the person. For example, sufferers of manic depression can refuse to take medication because the benefits of the mania outweigh the pain of depression. There are many pro-eating disorder groups springing up, admittedly this view of eating disorders as beneficial is mainly found within suffers themselves, but this can be ascribed to lack of awareness. This suggests that while sufferers of eating disorders and manic depression may not be able to be considered under the above heading of abnormality where they experience areas of life inaccessible to those not suffering from these ‘disorders’.

Also, physical disabilities affecting job opportunities (for example being too short to be a basketball player) are not pathological. So, using this definition is not satisfactory for it is not generally applicable.

A theory which may help to solve some difficulties encountered above would be that of unexpectedness. First suggested by Wakefield (1992), this considers personal distress, distress of others or violation of social norms and disability only as indicative of abnormality when the disorder is unexpected and/or out of proportion with environmental stressors. This is a much more successful answer to the problem, of defining abnormality although it is not a complete one for it does not resolve all of the issues raised with each proposed definition.

Because of all the above difficulties in defining ‘abnormality’; and to allow clinical work to continue, it has been found to be necessary to form specific diagnostic tools, namely ICD and DSM (also useful in determining treatments and ensuring consistency). These help to temporarily reduce the problem but do not solve it entirely, for arguments over their contents arise from the difficulty in defining the terms from which they work from.